Public perceptions of a polarised climate debate predominantly frame the key actors as climate scientists (CSs) versus sceptical voices (SVs); however it is unclear why CSs and SVs choose to participate in this hostile and antagonistic public battle. This research uses a narrative interview approach to better understand the underlying rationales behind 22 CSs and SVs engagement in the climate debate. It focuses in particular on potential overlaps between previously polarised individuals as well as each actor's ability to be critically self-reflexive about their own opinions about climate change, as well as of the opinions of those who hold different views. Several overlapping rationales are identified such as a sense of duty to publicly engage, agreement that complete certainty about the complex assemblage of climate change is an unattainable prospect, and that political factors are a key topic of interest in the climate debate. The paper concludes that a focus on potential overlaps in perceptions and rationales as well as the ability to be critically self-reflexive may encourage constructive discussion even amongst actors who had previously engaged in purposefully antagonistic exchange.
Introduction
Within the positivist scientific tradition, scepticism refers to an organised investigation of reality via empirical observation, informed questioning and doubting claims based on anecdotal evidence or belief (Gower, 1997) . However, in the context of climate change, scepticism has become increasingly associated with a public perception of a dualistic, antagonistic "climate debate" characterised by intense disagreement regarding the existence of a scientific consensus on the reality of anthropogenic climate change (Hobson & Niemeyer, 2012) . This perception of polarisation appears justified, as the majority of public-facing debates about climate change present the key actors as climate scientists (CSs) versus sceptical voices (SVs) 1 debating the legitimacy of scientific claims in a hostile "battle" or "duel" (Hoffman, 2011; McKewon, 2012) . Verheggen et al. (2014, p. 8964) note that the existence of scientific consensus about climate change is at the 'center of the public debate also suggest that debate is predominantly represented in public as focusing on perceptions of truth of scientific evidence. This differs to more common academic understandings which encompasses both science and policy (Martin & Rice, 2014) or, as Rayner (2012, p. 117) suggests, an awareness that the climate debate includes policy debate 'conducted by means of a surrogate dispute over the quality of the science'. Indeed, rhetorical devices such as the notion of "sound science" are understood to be particularly important in terms of the ability to frame fundamentally political debates as scientifically-based (McGarity, 2003 (McGarity, -2004 . Whilst causality between scientific evidence and policy action is complex to establish and is not the focus here, the perception of an active scientific debate about the anthropogenic nature or severity of climate change is important because climate change is unlikely to appear on policymakers' agendas without public recognition of its legitimacy as a basis for policy action (Pralle, 2009 ).
But why do CSs or SVs participate in the climate debate? Rooted in Converse's (1964) notion of issue publics where individuals are more interested in issues of perceived personal relevance, a vast literature exists to investigate motivations behind public participation in political debates. Increasing attention is however being paid to participation in specific topic areas, particularly those combining science and controversial policy implications. Examining stem-cell research, Ho et al. (2011) find that perceptions of media bias are directly and positively associated with issue-specific participation and Becker et al. (2010) find that ideological predispositions and attention to particular media are also relevant. Goidel & Nisbet (2006) suggest that religious organisations are influential in increasing participation, but that opinion intensity and news attentiveness are also significant. In the case of climate change, opinion leaders are found to play an important role as 'connective communication tissue' (Nisbet, 2011, p. 357) within issue publics, helping to recruit previously passive members to become further involved. Individuals are thus inspired to move up Milbraith's (1965) hierarchy of political participation, from "spectator" to "gladiator"-type activities (such as contributing time in a campaign) in order to influence others' opinions. However this literature is predominantly focused on political participation by the general public, and is inadequate to explain why those actors presented as the key participants in contentious and vocal public debate (in this case, CSs and SVs) are drawn into, or actively choose to participate in the public scientific controversy in question. These actors are clearly differentiated within the debate from the general public in terms of their (self or other) designated status as holders of relevant expertise (Stehr & Grundmann, 2011; Turner, 2014) . The allocation of expert status is fundamental, as those who are deemed "experts" are, within an evidencebased policy model, regarded to have a greater degree of influence and power over subsequent policy decisions (Weible, 2008) . Actor involvement therefore not only legitimises existing expertise as designated within more formal epistemic communities of science, but is also a way to introduce 'maverick scientific claims' (Collins, 2014, p. 722) into the debate. Thus, whereas attention has previously been directed towards individual understanding of and personal engagement with climate change as an issue (Wolf & Moser, 2011) , it is apparent that a gap exists in terms of understanding the underlying motivations behind more active and vocal participation in public-facing debate.
It is possible that fundamental and impenetrable differences exist between certain CSs and SVs, with each actor group entering and operating within the climate debate according to distinct paradigms (Kuhn, 1962) . For example, scientists are understood to be particularly anxious about retaining control over knowledge claims (Poliakoff & Webb, 2007) , with Young & Matthews finding that scientists become especially concerned when they perceive the public as changing the 'meanings of claims based on non-scientific values and principles ' (2007, p. 141) . This may be understood as reflecting a desire to uphold the pre-eminence of the positivist scientific tradition as a basis for evidence-based decision-making (Wesselink, Colebatch, & Pearce, 2014) as well as (perhaps unconscious) boundary-making activity (Gieryn, 1999) . This research therefore aims to fill a critical empirical and conceptual gap in the literature by investigating not only why CSs and SVs participate in the climate debate, but also how the paradigms in which they operate may contribute towards the antagonistic nature of the debate itself. It may be that resistance and communication challenges are inevitable, particularly regarding valuing certain types of knowledge and the role of science/scientists in political decision-making. Alternatively, these differences may not be innate, but it is the public perception of a polarised, scientifically-focused debate that frames actors as fundamentally different. Thus, framing participants as duelling adversaries in the media (Zhao, Rolfe-Redding, & Kotcher, 2014) or via labelling practices (Howarth & Sharman, 2015) , helps to co-construct polarisation over time, ignoring potentially important underlying similarities between actor groups such as overlaps in motivations for involvement or operating paradigms. Ravetz's (2011 Ravetz's ( , 2012 recent work on Climategate using post-normal science gives plausibility to the latter scenario. He finds that, in addition to discomfort experienced by CSs when the speaking truth to power model of the sciencepolicy interface is challenged, so too are many SVs made uneasy. Thus this research builds on work from authors such as Malone (2009) and Hulme (2009) by paying greater attention towards paring back the discussion, i.e. understanding that debate may be more about how science operates and what its implications may be for policy, rather than technical disagreements. In so doing, it also refers to notions of more diverse expertise within society (Pfister & Horvath, 2014; Solli & Ryghaug, 2014) and the potential need for 'a more open and interactive boundary' (Berkhout, 2010, p. 565 ) within public-science discourse than is presently the case.
In 2014, twelve CSs and SVs all active on social media met in the UK in an effort to 'calm the debate' (Yeo, 2014) . Such, albeit unusual, occasions indicate the possibility that the actors involved have a more nuanced understanding of the different rationales that contribute to each other's opinion about climate change. It also suggests that engendering some kind of deliberative fora in order to avoid the more common dead-end 'dialogues of the deaf ' (van Eeten, 1999, p. 185) evident in public scientific controversies may be necessary in order to inspire critical self-reflexivity to occur. Self-reflexivity is a crucial process as it, in essence, requires individuals to question their own inherent assumptions and values (Cunliffe, 2004) , and is arguably particularly important for actors involved in polarised and adversarial public debates. This paper thus aims to better understand the underlying rationales behind CSs' and SVs' participation in the climate debate, focusing in particular on potential overlaps between previously polarised individuals as well as each actor's ability to be critically self-reflexive about their own and others' opinions about climate change. Examining together the underlying rationales behind issue publics and more formal epistemic community participation in public scientific controversies is important because it may suggest avenues for constructive dialogue, rather than dualistic debate. This is a critical methodological distinction because it innately reduces the dichotomy of the lay public versus an accredited knowledge holder(s).
Method
A series of 22 semi-structured interviews of approximately one hour using an identical question set were conducted with UK-based individuals identified as CSs (n=11) and SVs (n=11) ( Table 1) . In order to delve beyond explicit statements of self-declared rationales towards more latent motivations, interviews aimed to enable participants to build their own narratives and to critically self-reflect on them throughout the interview. While research interviews engender an artificial situation (Hollway & Jefferson, 2000) where interviewees may feel the need to provide answers they think the interviewer wants to hear (Schwarz, 1999) , stories told within an interview can also form part of an important 'meaning-making process' (Seidman, 2013, p. 7) , interpreted by the researcher using theoretical underpinnings to form relevant conclusions. Daniels & Endfield (2009) suggest that the method in which people receive and interpret climate change information, particularly of its "dangerous" nature, affects resulting actions. Thus, by producing their own stories, interviewees offer a window into personal experiences and a mechanism by which to self-reflect (Hards, 2012) . Hiller & DiLuzio (2004) also suggest that interviewees participating in narrative-based interviews carry out a complex discursive activity known as reflexive progression. Through this process the interviewer can 'push further for linkages, motivations and clarifications that lead to new discoveries by the interviewee… [and create] some kind of order that was previously unclear, even to the interviewee' (Hiller & Diluzio, 2004, p. 17) .
Questions covered three main themes: (i) how each actor perceives themselves, (ii) perception of a dominant "other" (most commonly framed as a polarised adversary), and (iii) the perceived usefulness of participating in a vocal and public debate, including perceptions of debate framing. Interview transcripts were analysed using a mixture of descriptive and thematic coding (Thomas, 2006) . Whilst verbally narrating their thought process, interviewees were also asked to place their opinion, and that of a dominant "other" (representing the main arguments encountered that oppose their point of view) on a spectrum of opinion with two axes (science and policy), building on Capstick & Pidgeon's (2013) epistemic and response scepticism 3 . Individuals from the 'list of sceptics 'mentioned' more than once in 10 UK national newspapers' (Painter, 2011, p. 128) 4 UK-based blog authors from Sharman (2014) 4 Involved with the activities of the GWPF e.g. Academic Advisory Council or published on GWPF website 3
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Participating CSs' specialisms included climate modelling and climate physics, with all participating in public engagement activities such as public speaking and blogging. Individuals were selected based on Kahan's (2013) list of characteristics defining a credible scientist, including professional experience in the climate science field (e.g. contributors to IPCC assessment reports), number of peerreviewed publications, and seniority. SVs were identified from three main sources: Painter's (2011, p. 128) 'list of sceptics 'mentioned' more than once in 10 UK national newspapers'; Sharman's (2014) climate sceptical blog authors, chosen due to online sources' increasing importance in the climate debate (Gavin & Marshall, 2011) ; and those associated with the Global Warming Policy Foundation (GWPF), a well-known sceptical voice about climate change in the UK 2 .
Perceptions of self
A number of themes emerged in the interviews outlining CSs self-perceptions, with the dominant theme best summarised as a "youth-driven aspiration" echoing the actor's personal calling to the issue that "was stimulating intellectually (…) [that] gave me the impression that I was doing something positive or useful" (CS2). The CSs' growing curiosity appears to emerge at a young age often stemming from personal experiences of nature where "I just enjoyed being outdoors" (CS5), and being in close proximity to "the natural world which surrounded our houses" (CS1).
Memories of an influential idol also contributed: "someone came and gave a talk at my primary school (…) I got worried about the environment (…). I ended up in climate change I guess as a result of that really" (CS10)
. The CSs' self-perception creates a narrative framed in nostalgia with an engrained awareness of the issue from an early age: "I've always had an interest in energy, right from being a child. My dad worked at a nuclear power station and we lived around the corner from it" (CS1).
Two themes further characterise this youthful aspiration: a "romantic fascination" for the environment and a "heroic desire" to do good. CSs have experienced a journey with an early realisation of scepticism on the issue: "climate wasn't really a subject, then" (CS7), "people's attitudes were, 'Why are you looking at this? It's not a serious topic for study.' Now it's much more mainstream" (CS11). However, sustained curiosity drives this romantic fascination: "I looked at the data that he showed me and I thought wow that is amazing" (CS3). For some, this passion originated later on after a few years in the field, as the original choice to work in climate change resulting from the need to be employed: "I was looking for a job at that time" (CS7), "I probably stumbled into the area (…) [after] 
finishing my PhD I needed a job" (CS4), "I didn't believe that this was going to be my life long career" (CS8).
What emerges from the majority of the CSs narratives is that they perceive themselves as having a "heroic desire" to "do something that felt more tangibly useful to society" (CS10) or to "[work] on a problem that was an important problem for society" (CS2). In making these statements and creating their personal narratives, the CSs were critically self-reflect on the value of their work to society as well as how this fits in the growing international context: "you are surrounded by world leading staff in an issue that was starting to gain global prominence; one couldn't help become interested in it" (CS4).
The spectrum also enabled actors to further self-reflect on their opinions with most CSs placing themselves in the top right quadrant (Figure 1 ) as "the way I see the evidence" (CS6) leads them to be "certain that we have some impact" (CS1). The precision and certainty with which the CSs perceive climate change as being certain and policy action required to address it demonstrates a common analytical approach with CS6 and CS9 drawing zones that they felt better described their opinions as evolving and/or wide with CS6 arguing "nothing is certain, but it's very certain" and CS9 Two related themes support the crusader rationale: "anti-hype" and "equity". Anti-hype involves the actor being triggered by a single event (e.g. Climategate) or gradually over time, to investigate scientific claims (and associated economic implications) and finding them "over-egged… exaggerated…not realistic" (SV8). This exaggeration is done by scientists, the media or others, all of whom have a financial stake in maintaining the mainstream consensus. Equity captures the opinion that current climate change policy is "hurting people…the poor in India…the poor in this country" (SV1) and thus the actor is "foolish or brave enough to…question the brightest people on the planet" (SV8) in order to fight for a society which "should be richer… more abundant, [ and where] more people should have access to more energy" (SV7).
The vast majority of SVs disagreed with government GHG emissions-reduction policies, nearexclusively on a costliness argument: "the only way to do this [climate policy] is to actually bust the economy…and the people that are really going to suffer are going to be those at the bottom of the pile" (SV11). However, opinion as regards the certainty of scientific evidence for anthropogenic climate change was divergent, with most finding placing themselves on the spectrum (Figure 1 ) "difficult" because "certain is a bad word in science" (SV2). The spectrum also highlighted the challenge SV felt of articulating necessary "caveats and assumptions" (SV10) into the debate. Many SVs railed against the public perception of the debate as "black and white, yes/no" arguing it should be more focused on "how much and which policies" (SV10, emphasis in the original). 
Perceptions of a dominant 'other'
CSs recognise a wide range of "voices that populate that entire spectrum" (CS8) of the debate ( Figure  2 ), making it almost impossible to identify a single opposing voice: "they cover quite a broad band so I wouldn't put a single spot" (CS3). SVs clearly identified a dominant other fuelled by vested interests, standing in direct contrast to their role as a crusader and "seeker after truth" (SV2). For example, SV9 explicitly rejects the oft-made claim that sceptical voices are themselves the ones most likely to have vested interests:
"…there is now so much money in it that there is huge vested interests in keeping it going. I think the irony is that the accusation made against what they call deniers like myself, they say oh, these people are in the pay of big oil. Well I can promise you I've never had a penny from any company engaged in the fossil fuel business. I'm into this because a) I think it's interesting, b) I think it's important and c) I think it's a huge economic issue."
These vested interests extend to scientists who are focused on "trying to save their jobs" (SV6). A distrust of the civil service (including but not limited to government scientists) was also present and related to perceptions of a left-wing agenda. SV6 ponders the question of "Are they doing it because they're left wing or are they left wing because they're in the bureaucracy? What's cause, what's effect, I don't know". This anger at a "politicised science" (SV5) whereby scientists ignore the "ugly facts" so that they can make a "political play" (SV11) was noteworthy and is particularly interesting when contrasted with perceptions of the role of evidence itself in the decision-making process.
Whereas there is frustration with "people who can't understand that if the policy isn't backed up by the evidence you shouldn't be doing the policy, especially if it's… costly" (SV3)
, this does not translate into agreement that "scientists ought to be having more impact on policies" (SV11, emphasis added). Evidence should be able to speak for itself because scientists, "are clearly, clearly not telling the truth" (SV1). Therefore while most of the SVs entered the climate change debate ostensibly due to disagreements over scientific elements (see the "crusader" discourse above), they do not perceive that the other is similarly-motivated by a search for scientific truth, and is instead corrupted by political or financial incentives. The dominant other is near-unanimously perceived to be certain about the scientific evidence for anthropogenic climate change and supportive of government GHG emissionsreduction policies, reflecting the public perception of a polarised debate (Figure 2 ). 
Debate participation and framing
Despite it at times affecting relationships with their peers, CSs see it as "essential" (CS2 . CSs therefore justify their caution in participating in debates where their opponent is given a platform because they "like a good debate" (CS4) and "just because they're vocal" (CS4). These public debates "should be much more focused" (CS7) with a "need to check the credibility of the people" (CS4) who choose to engage.
Most of the CSs believe the debate should not be political and that they as scientists should remain "impartial and humble and open to criticism (…) and willing to admit that you are sometimes wrong and listen to an opposing opinion and debate it and modify your position if you're wrong and take unpopular positions" (CS10).
The need for establishing a frame of credibility and expertise came across strongly from the CSs who believe those who participate in the debate must be accredited and where the authoritarians of climate science consist of "people who have got first or second degrees in relevant disciplines and have spent a certain amount of professional investment of their life and study and publishing" (CS8). CSs expressed frustration that the climate debate involves actors who mix science and policy issues when engaging with scientists thereby using the arguments interchangeably to suit their purpose: they are "resistant against the science when really they're resistant about policy" (CS10) and where "they're still propagating that policy scepticism back to the science" (CS10).
Numerous rationales justified SVs participation in the climate debate which the vast majority of SVs perceived as "politicised" (SV8) and expressed frustration that, in their view, it has become "very unscientific" (SV11 However, an overriding theme of "a sense of duty" (SV3) was apparent across nearly all interviewees as a driver for debate participation, as "somebody has to be [vocal] " (SV4 The polarised nature of the debate was seen as concerning, with SV7 noting that "everyone walks into the room knowing that there are two sides, and there's no nuance. And so you try and express some kind of perspective. Oh right, so you're not one of us, you're one of them, and it's really powerful". A clear and consistent message of disagreement with government policies was also a dominant framing strongly linked to rationales for involvement. This incursion of the political into a space where it doesn't belong was a reoccurring theme which was related to the notion of belief or religion, and sometimes with the idea of a scientific consensus. The other "really, really believes" (SV10) in their opinion, and the notion of climate science being 'settled' is particularly anathema as it suggests a situation of "don't argue, the science is certain. Believe." (SV11). The notion of belief stands in contrast to the desired pre-eminence of traditional scientific enquiry where "the arbiter of all the arguments is empirical evidence" (SV8). For many SVs, the notion of belief was also strongly linked to the way that labels were seen to frame the debate as antagonistic between duelling sides. SV11 also noted that the use of labels "more begs religion than it does science. When you have a religious orthodoxy, then people that disagree with it tend to be called deniers and hunted down". Labelling was regarded as "very unhelpful" (SV10) as it is perceived as a mechanism to shut down debate. It was also suggested that the use of labels can further polarise individuals as those using them "don't realise that members of the public are thinking, well, that's me as well he's talking about" (SV10) thus "forcing a dialogue between the middle ground…and the sceptics" (SV7).
No overriding clear signal existed as to the importance of either themselves or others being publicly vocal (despite all being chosen due to their public profile). While half believed that it was "absolutely" (SV9) vital to vocally express their opinion, others were more cautious, with SV7 suggesting that it "depends on the level of the debate" as to whether or not participation was recommended. SV8 took recourse in the idea that evidence would be the key arbiter, only wanting to be vocal "in a measured way [as] we're not campaigners…at the end of the day arguments will win". And whereas SV6 considered it critical to be active in the debate as "people have to fight their corners, so yes, the more the merrier", he also noted that it would be "nice if 
Discussion and conclusion
This research aims to establish a better understanding of the underlying rationales behind the participation of climate scientists' (CSs) and sceptical voices' (SVs) in the climate debate, focusing in particular on potential overlaps between previously polarised individuals as well as each actor's ability to be critically self-reflexive about their own and others' opinions about climate change. Three research themes were investigated using a narrative format: perception of self, perception of a dominant "other", and the perceived usefulness of participating in a vocal and public debate, including perceptions of debate framing. Table 2 summarises the dominant themes emerging from both CS and SV narratives. While the sample size of 22 interviewees necessitates caveats regarding the representativeness of these findings and suggests the need for further research with a larger population, what is immediately apparent is the significant degree of overlap between themes expressed by both actor groups, particularly in terms of motivations for debate participation and framing. Overlaps between perceptions regarding the scientific evidence for anthropogenic climate change and awareness that much debate centres on policy decision-making as shown in the spectrums are also noted. 
An immediately obvious example is the mutual sense of duty to participate in the climate debate, albeit recognising that CSs and SVs may have differing levels of inclination as to particular venues for engagement, such as the peer-reviewed literature and university press releases versus live public debates or blogosphere discussion. As recipients of public funds CSs identify an obligation to express their findings even if these are not welcomed: "We're paid by the state to do our work and ensure that message is got out" even if "we know it's politically unpalatable" (CS9). Nisbet & Markowitz's (2014) finding that scientists' engagement in overtly public activities such as media appearances is a function of political outlook, as well as belief that media coverage was important for career advancement, is thus likely applicable in this instance. Nearly identical in tone are SV perceptions of being "worried" or "concerned" (SV11) (particularly about climate policy implications) and thus being obliged to start lobbying or engaging directly in public in order to "get a hearing" (SV8). Another interesting overlap was the recognition that certainty was a challenging concept both to pin down and as a basis for policy decision-making. While there were clearly differences of opinion regarding the level and/or nature of certainty required for policy implementation, likely the result of distinct "ways of life" as explained by cultural theory (O'Riordan & Jordan, 1999) , many CSs and SVs acknowledged that the notion of a general scientific certainty about such a complex assemblage as climate change is unattainable. If it is recognised that it is more the "degree of effect" (SV1) that is contested or the way that one can be "certain about some things and not quite so certain about others" (CS9), a more explicit discussion about the trade-offs between this inherently uncertain scientific evidence and political decision-making may be more productive than debating the specific technical details of that evidence.
While a common public perception is that of a single debate where climate scientists are representatives of scientific truth and sceptical voices are the dominant challengers (Hoffman, 2011; McKewon, 2012) , this research contributes to understanding of a more complex reality by also highlighting the potential misalignment of actors and their roles in engaging in public debate. Nearly all SVs expressed an underlying interest in the impact of climate change policies on the economy, with CSs also being acutely aware that much of the debate centred on disagreement about policy choice rather than the science itself. If the actor-subject interaction in public discourse were to be renegotiated (i.e. politicians debating policies rather than CSs, or CSs choosing to debate the policy implications of their research), it may reduce the exhaustive nature of the debate where dead-end arguments are being held precisely because they do not make explicit what is actually being debated, i.e. Rayner's (2012) The suggestion of critical self-reflexivity evident in some interviews, such as SV6 and SV8 who presented themselves as able to (at least explicitly) acknowledge that personal values shaped their opinion, was also interesting. It was however not evident in the majority of interviews. We contend that critical selfreflexivity is likely to be particularly useful in debate re-framing as it helps to pare back the actual topic of disagreement (see Hulme 2009 ) and forces the centre of the debate to shift towards a more explicit policy or values-focused dialogue. This is particularly important for public perceptions of climate change and how debate is understood to be a useful and necessary part of the scientific process.
Nonetheless, despite uncertainty regarding the extent to which self-reflexivity did or can occur, what we consider the more important outcome of the narrative method employed for this research is its ability to uncover overlap in interviewees' perceptions and rationales. Therefore, what is particularly significant is that even the way that each "side" of this polarised debate chose to express themselves can invite the possibility for constructive dialogue, for example, understanding that derogatory labelling practices are regarded as mutually unproductive. Critically, identifying and emphasising these commonalities can be seen as a possible mechanism to defuse the antagonism evident in the debate-it is more difficult to continue an aggressive and hostile argument when participants are reminded of, for example, an expressed mutual love of enquiry and scientific understanding. Building on cultural interpretations of the many different understandings of climate change (Hulme, 2014; O'Riordan & Jordan, 1999) , we therefore suggest that a focus on potential overlaps between underlying (and/or manifestly expressed) rationales behind climate opinions may encourage constructive discussion even with actors who had previously engaged in purposefully antagonistic exchange.
Notes

1.
The identifying term sceptical voice is an attempt to move away from the problematic labelling constructs evident in the climate debate (Howarth & Sharman, 2015) , but follows Painter (2011) in recognising the need for a pragmatic descriptor. 2. Four interviewees from Painter (2011) and Sharman (2014) also had links to the GWPF. 3. Two interviewees (one CS, one SV) were critical of the notion of "certain" evidence for anthropogenic climate change and chose not to respond.
